University Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) are strategic sites for examining efforts to concretize, frame, and market early stage technologies. This paper draws on eighteen months of fieldwork in a private university TLO to analyze collective decisionmaking efforts during licensing meetings. I describe three processes --docket description, deal framing, and problem resolution --that highlight the central role locally sensible strategies and languages play in describing and comparing disparate technologies. Such approaches reflect the collective experience of licensing associates and, when rationalized through organizational learning, represent the processual underpinnings of ongoing transformations in the institutional arrangements of U.S. universities. Close examination of meeting discussions reveals multiple 'conceptual spaces' that support TLO decision-making and more closely connects theoretical work in Science and Technology Studies with theories of organizational learning and with Economic Sociology's growing emphasis on commensuration.
Introduction.
In the wake of the 1980 Bayh-Dole act (Public Law 96-517), U.S. universities rushed to commercialize academic research conducted with the aid of federal funding.
The next two decades witnessed transformations in the uses of academic science and engineering heralded by dramatic increases in university patenting, an explosion of licensing activity, and the emergence of a new professional group. Academic licensing efforts administered by the Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) that now exist on all but a handful of university campuses generated more than $1 billion in revenue in 2000.
Work in TLOs has also resulted in the prosecution of more then 20,000 U.S. patents and the foundation of more than 2000 new corporations (Association of University Technology Managers, 2000) . University technology transfer is, increasingly, big business.
The growth of TLOs marks a watershed for academic science and engineering.
Scholars from multiple disciplines have recently turned their attention to academic technology transfer efforts in works emphasizing alterations to the careers and practices of scientists and engineers (Kleinman, 2003; Kleinman & Vallas, 2001; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001) ; transformations in the institutional arrangements that govern academic competitions for status and resources (Owen-Smith, 2003; Packer & Webster 1996) ; shifts in academic contributions to state and national economic systems (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1998; Feller, 1990; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1996) ; and challenges to long standing distinctions between the public and private domains that enable basic research efforts (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Nelson, 2004) and underpin conceptions of academic freedom and intellectual property (Krimsky, 2003; McSherry, 2001) . While often less than sanguine about the changes they document, most scholars agree that research commercialization represents a transformation at the heart of academe.
TLOs are important professional and practical loci for such changes. A survey of 142 U.S. universities conducted in the year 2000 reported that all but 10 had initiated formal technology transfer efforts, and fully 37% (N=53) had done so in the 1990s (Association of University Technology Managers, 2000) . TLOs are relatively new but important players in the elaboration of a hybrid university research mission that mixes commercial and academic rules for the production, dissemination, and use of scientific findings. Whether they are conceptualized as an integral component of a new university production function (Siegel et. al., 1999; Thursby & Thursby, 2002) , a locus of organizational learning (Mowery et. al., 2001; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003) , or a site for active but often invisible boundary work (Guston, 1999; Kaghan, 2001; McCray & Croissant, 2001 ), TLOs offer a unique window onto the micro-processes that are reshaping the university.
TLOs are also strategic research sites at the intersection of science studies, economic sociology, and organizational theory, three literatures that have only recently begun to converge (c.f., Callon, 1998; Owen-Smith, 2001; Vaughan, 1999) . This paper draws upon eighteen months (November, 1999  May, 2001 ) of observational field work in a private university technology licensing office (henceforth 'the TLO') 1 to forge conceptual links between (1) science studies' concern with the heterogeneously assembled and contingent character of facts and artifacts (Bijker, 1995; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987) ; (2) organizational theory's focus on situated decision-making and the standardizing effects of organizational learning (March, 1978; March & Olsen, 1976; Powell, 1985) , and (3) economic sociology's emphasis on the role commensuration plays in the construction and maintenance of contracts and markets (Espeland & Stevens 1998; Levin & Espeland 2002) . Though seemingly far flung, these themes converge in my analysis of three processes in the TLO.
Licensing work occurs at the intersection of academic, policy, and market regimes (Guston, 1999) . Technology licensing officers thus face complex and often contradictory pressures as they struggle to identify, manage, and market the early stage technologies developed in the course of academic research projects. Though that work and its effects on organizational and institutional arrangements has largely remained invisible (McCray & Croissant, 2001) , the characteristic language and tools of TLO work harness and direct the universities' productive capabilities while maintaining permeable boundary between the academy and industry (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2004) .
Collective efforts to define early stage technologies highlight the socio-technical dimensions that must be stabilized if innovations are to be protected by patents and transferred though licensing deals. Descriptions of technologies in TLO meetings illuminate the array of features that licensing professionals use to characterize and market inventions. The social and organizational arrangements that help constitute technologies are rendered transparent in discussions of 'dockets'; complex entities that might prompt licensing associates to agree that the objects of their work ' . . . take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities' (Law, 1999: 3) .
The TLO's mission  ' [T] o promote the transfer of "Elite Private University"
technologies for society's use and benefit while generating unrestricted income for support of research and education'  highlights the contradictory institutional pressures inherent in academic licensing work. A mission that mixes identification and transfer of novel technologies with concerns about public benefit and revenue generation places the TLO's inhabitants squarely at the intersection of science and commerce. That position requires them: (1) to grapple with the complex, heterogeneous character of the dockets they assemble; and (2) to construct deals that will transfer technologies to market in a fashion that ensures both broad access and income that can be reinvested in EPU science.
In more theoretical terms, the TLO's work encompasses the construction, maintenance, and translation of technological assemblages. Acts of definition and stabilization often occur contiguously with efforts to frame those socio-technical arrays as unitary and nonoverlapping bundles of property rights, which are transferable through contracts (Callon, 1999) .
Defining dockets and doing deals overlap in TLO work and both processes rely on a similar constellation of socio-technical features. But framing and deal-making efforts are necessarily imperfect. Changing situations and mutable technologies throw up complicated problem cases, which TLO associates call 'sagas'. Resolving such problems is a key concern for the office. Efforts to manage sagas often encompass both the renegotiation of deals and the reassembly of dockets.
Sagas are reported in meetings where their resolutions emerge through a process of collective sense-making (Weick, 1995) . Discussions draw comparisons along multiple dimensions to re-cast obdurate or complex problems in terms of prior experiences to which existing solutions apply. This fluid, discursive process of comparison is a species of commensuration. Commensuration, '. . . the comparison of different entities according to a common metric' (Espeland and Stevens 1998: 313) has much in common with
Callon's conception of framing. It also relates to the emphasis on translation that is common to both actor network theory (Latour, 1999) and narrative management theory (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1997 Dockets also bundle inventors, deals and licensees. They are assembled and maintained by work done in the office and sometimes pull disparate inventions together on the assumption they will be easier to market as a package. Such a dynamic is evident in the following monthly meeting discussion where Lisa presents a new disclosure that reports a method to minimize a commonly used research device.
Lisa: Doug is looking at different ways to miniaturize this instrument. I think it could be good for all kinds of measurement devices. He thinks it might also be useful in the biotech space, but I am not sure how so I am going to market it as an entrepreneurial opportunity. This short discussion implies many features of dockets. Rather than representing a 'naked' technology, Lisa's brief report -recall that monthly meetings rarely feature expansive discussions -encompasses potential uses, the preferences, suggestions, and identity of inventors, and traces of her own strategizing. When Larry notes a technical similarity between her disclosure and another docket that carries its own technicalinventor-market constellation, the picture becomes more complex. Here, two associates emphasize some of the socio-technical components that comprise dockets while working to actively bundle disparate technologies for market.
Such construction efforts suggest that dockets are malleable. The TLO staff does exercise a degree of explicit control over the shape dockets eventually take and the uses to which they are put. Nevertheless, it is common for associates to report upon obdurate or problematic aspects of docket assemblages that require 'management'. conceptualization of dockets as socio-technical assemblages while emphasizing the subtle training role that meeting discussions play.
The Demography of Docket Components.
Elaborated meeting notes captured 157 distinct descriptions of individual dockets.
For the purposes of coding, such portrayals are characterizations of new and active dockets offered by associates to their colleagues in meetings. Open coding of these descriptions yielded a set of fifteen distinct socio-technical components that were included in at least one depiction. Table 1 presents those components along with a brief definition and their absolute and relative frequency of appearance.
[ This excerpt provides a clear sense of the expansiveness with which associates view the 'contents' of dockets. This example encompasses (1) technical dimensions, (2) the inventor and his relationship to (3) a potential licensee whose (4) deal --an option to take a license after the (5) scientific publication has been used to broadly 'shop' the docket --may or may not include (6) significant sponsored project funding that triggers (7) the invocation of a specific EPU conflict of interest (COI) policy on whose outcome this particular socio-technical constellation depends − 'We are waiting for conflict on that one'.
The final, policy-oriented, feature of this excerpt evokes another long-standing analytic emphasis of Actor Network Theory: the link between the stability and mobility of socio-technical arrays (Latour 1987 There was a vague reference in an old paper that suggested this could be done. They decided it was obvious. No one on our side agrees but [expressive shrug]. Susan: Just go for it. The grant is peer-reviewed and their focus is more applied than an NIH section. He has been a good inventor for us. Besides if it shows efficacy in clinicals, then we will be really glad we did this.
In this case an established inventor requests that the TLO file a new patent application, the CIP, for a therapeutic compound they had been unable to successfully patent or license in the past. The inventor's confidence rests on his successful application for a grant that will fund development work and pre-clinical testing, but the decision must be made quickly as a conference presentation publicly disclosed the new data. The discussion begins with a docket description that emphasizes inventor characteristics, technology, intellectual property, funding, and costs, and ends with a question about whether to pursue further patent protection in light of these factors. The subsequent conversation emphasizes more docket characteristics as suggestions are made and skepticism offered. Licensee characteristics and responses to marketing efforts are discussed along with a more detailed consideration of potential IP difficulties before a decision is made.
In total, nine 9 of the fifteen components highlighted in Table 1 are mobilized in this collective decision-making effort. Susan's final judgment emphasizes three dimensions: drawing on (1) the expert evaluation offered by peer review, (2) the inventor's track record with the office, and (3) the potential market value of a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved drug. This field note excerpt suggests that diverse features of dockets are used both for descriptive and decision-making purposes.
Multiple docket features are also actively considered in decisions about how and to whom to license. Information gleaned from broad marketing efforts, 'shopping', and from more specific evaluations by potential licensees play an important role in docket construction. In the excerpt above, the decision about whether to add a patent to a docket hinges, in part, upon levels of corporate interest in a prior patent application covering the same technology. The interleaved character of assembly and marketing efforts highlights two features of dockets that make their transfer through market mechanisms problematic:
(1) dockets are only as stable as their least stable components (Latour, 1999: 151-53; Law 2003) , (2) successful marketing requires that heterogeneously assembled technologies be framed as discrete and separable entities (Callon, 1999) .
10
Latour and Law remind us of the effort required to enroll diverse actors into a coherent and stable fact or artifact. Like dockets in the TLO, ". . .an object is an effect of an array of relations, the effect, in short, of a network. . . .
[I]t holds together, it is an object, while those relations hold together and don't change their shape" (Law, 2003: 1) . Callon (1999: 188) agrees but contends that the sale of such an object requires that those very connections be obscured:
Framing is an operation used to define individual agents, which are clearly distinct and dissociated from one another. It also allows for the definition of objects, goods, and merchandise, which are perfectly identifiable and can be separated not only from other goods but also from the actors involved, for example, in their conception, production, circulation, or use. 
Gloria:
The major issue is that they want access to Paul's technology, but they are pushing us to agree not to do any 'commercial' research under the deal. That is really cutting into the holy clause. 11 We just added a line to the deal that says we are a university of course we do not do commercial research. I am hoping that takes care of that.
In this case a deal includes a licensee's attempt to restrict research conducted by a faculty member. This source of potential entanglements is met with a proactive attempt at management. In a clear example of boundary work (Gieryn, 1999; Guston, 1999; Lamont & Molnar, 2002) , Gloria emphasizes (with some irony) that academic institutions do not do commercial research and thus cannot face such restrictions.
12 This excerpt highlights TLO efforts to anticipate incipient difficulties, their proactive efforts to limit entanglements, and the Janus-faced role enforced by their academic status.
Further entanglements can emerge from sponsored projects that support ongoing research and sometimes carry options to IP rights for sponsors. 13 Options offer 'rights of first refusal' to technologies, which result in 'encumbered' licenses where deals with other corporations must be negotiated 'but for' existing contracts with sponsors. Preexisting rights further confuse framing efforts, making negotiations more challenging and contributing to the birth of sagas.
Two discussion excerpts -one from a Physci meeting the other from the Bioteam -emphasize the ubiquity of FOU deals and the complex problems that limited exclusivities catalyze. In the following Physci excerpt, the group discusses problems arising from a field-of-use exclusive license granted to a local start-up company. The technology in question emerged from an ongoing project at the university, whose multiple corporate sponsors received options for non-exclusive licenses in return for their involvement. These options were intended to expire when the project ended but were unexpectedly extended when it received additional funding. Here pre-existing options, a changing business environment, and imperfectly framed field definitions require associates to collectively make sense of a challenging legal and technical situation. There are even some big companies interested. Nutra-co wants to license it for tests in a manufacturing facility. But that use is partially covered by both Xigene and Genlight. Xigene does not matter but Genlight's exclusive could be a problem. Dairy-co wants a license for a similar internal use. I'm trying to figure out how to define new FOUs so that we can license the thing as broadly as possible. The problem here is not in the technology. It is in our ambiguous language. This is a problem we have talked about before. When we did this deal Jennifer told us the field was too broad, but we decided to go ahead even though we knew that we would have to get any new licensees to buy in but for Genlight. Now Genlight is back and they want to extend their licenses and clarify their field. Molly: Just offer them a trade. Tell them that you will let them extend and clarify without the usual fee if they will allow you to do two new non-ex licenses in their field.
[Two months later, Leanne offered the following update to the Bioteam] Leanne: On that protein technology license to Genlight, we are broadening their exclusive FOU and in return they are letting us do two new non-ex licenses. So Genlight now has all of the [Z related] areas except for [X], which we originally carved out for Bioneuvo.
Again a technology that overflows the partitions that multiple FOU deals place around it raises problems. Cleanly bounded fields of use are challenged as numerous companies express interest in different aspects of a technology that is used to identify the presence of specific proteins in solutions. The situation is exacerbated by pressures from a licensee (Genlight) to broaden its term and breadth of exclusivity, and by a set of new overlapping deals that may become the wellsprings of future sagas. The problem at issue grew from the interstices of several TLO characteristics. A lack of legal or technical training may have contributed to potential conflicts in deals and FOUs. Similarly, deep concern with the mandate to license widely drove Leanne's desire to accommodate all potential licensees in the face of an early contract the office recognized as overly broad.
The solution Molly proffers and Leanne implements is, predictably, less legal or technological than relational. Rather than revising contractual language or seeking a technical way out of the difficulties raised by overlapping fields, associates trained in and experienced with the TLOs relational focus pursue a trade with a long-time licensee.
Here, a relative novice's presentation of a complex problem evokes a simple and locally appropriate solution from a more experienced colleague. In this case, experience transfers easily in a meeting as Molly helps resolve a clearly defined problem. More often than not, though, easy resolutions are unavailable and meetings become a location where new problems are re-defined in terms of older situations. Commensuration, the act of comparing different entities along a common metric, is central to such efforts.
Commensuration and Problem Resolution.
Commensuration's market making characteristics center on the actual processes by which incommensurable entities are transformed into a common metric that enables their comparison and transfer. Levin and Espeland (2002: 135) highlight the features of commensuration that are most central to understanding work in the TLO.
Commensuration initiates transformations of all sorts. It turns qualities into quantities, heterogeneous goods into homogeneous ones, messy complexity into straightforward hierarchy. A key mechanism in the structuring of markets, it helps change intangible things . . . into commodities.
In the TLO, commensuration work occurs in meetings where comparisons reconfigure new and unfamiliar problems in terms of established solutions to existing challenges.
Thus, commensuration is central to the process TLO associates use to resolve sagas generated when messy, heterogeneously assembled dockets overflow the frames that enable their transfer to market.
Analyses of TLO discussions also contribute to theories of commensuration.
Much commensuration occurs through the development of a single 'objective' metric that allows easy comparison of varied entities. Consider, for instance, futures prices that enable ready trading in commodities as varied as pork bellies, crude oil, pollution, and gold. The salient role multiple docket dimensions play in office decisions suggests that any given docket carries multiple competing metrics for comparison. The challenge, then, is to determine which possible comparison fits. TLO comparisons center on objects that are locally and collectively assembled. TLO associates are highly experienced with local presentation and discussion styles, but generally lack professional training in legal or technical fields. In short, the 'correct' metric for any given comparison the office undertakes is neither given in the order of things being compared, nor encoded in normative standards of professional conduct.
Instead, I contend, active dimensions for comparison emerge from discussions of dockets. When faced with novel situations, associates draw on commonly invoked docket features to search for an appropriate metric. The variety of possible dimensions enables workable and appropriate comparisons at the expense of significant differences between cases. Thus successful commensuration on any given dimension necessarily represents simplification and translation across complex situations. Consider the following example where recognition of a shared faculty advisor results in a similar licensing deal. E-co and F-co are two start-ups founded by students from a research group run by Dalton, a senior faculty member and prolific inventor. Both companies depend on (different) inventions developed in Dalton's lab and he is an inventor on both patents. In this excerpt, Larry, expresses concerns based on Dalton's involvement with the companies.
Larry:
Here is another Dalton student wanting to start a company. I remember how difficult he was when we licensed E-co. So I am planning to use that model for this new company. F-co is a good bet, [the student founder] put together a good business team. He proposed an exclusive deal for one FOU and a non-ex for the other areas. It looks a whole lot like the deal we did with E-co, which was also exclusive for one field and non-ex for the others. This technology has some pretty important applications. So I think F-co should be a three-year deal. The problem is that E-co wants to extend their old license and I'm afraid that if we give them two more years Dalton will push for a full five years up front for F-co. I do not want to do that because the potential for this docket is too big. Now if F-co comes back in three years and says "We want a couple more," then . . . Susan: We'll do exactly what we did with E-co. We will shop it and if no one else wants it, then we will extend. Larry: Is it justifiable to give F-co the same terms as E-co even though they are cheap by today's standards and this is a larger field?
In this case an experienced associate tries to head off potential difficulties by appealing to a key similarity between this case and an older deal: E-co and F-co founders share an academic advisor and co-inventor who has raised difficulties for the office before.
Despite important and explicitly noted disparities in market potential and implied differences between business teams, the same advisor and similarly structured proposals lead Larry to suggest a shorter term license than he might otherwise consider. His final question emphasizes both the similarities that contributed to his decision and the differences that, though manifest, were less active.
14 Content coding of field notes yielded 74 comparisons like those presented above. Table 2 lists the 11 dimensions associates used to make those comparisons.
[ Table 2 here]
The most notable feature of Table 2 is its remarkable similarity to Table 1 (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) but by means of comparison metrics that are actively deployed in an unstructured but constrained search for locally sensible connections between existing sets of problems and resolutions.
Commensuration efforts reach across gaps in relations among technologies, markets, teams and time to connect disparate cases and link extant solutions to active problems. Such processes are akin the ways in which organizations, such as the TLO, 'learn'. Organizational learning refers to the instantiation of retrievable knowledge that is independent of individual organizational members in the rules, routines, standards, procedures, and stories of a collective (Levitt & March, 1988) .
Contrasts sometimes result in the statement of general rules that can be easily mobilized at a later date without the need for active commensuration. Consider the following case where discussion of licensing strategies for a 'nutriceutical' docket prompts a comparison to another edible technology and a failed match leads to the statement of a general rule.
Christine:
So basically what they want to do is put out a tastier version of a product that is already on the market. Robert: Isn't that what Ken was doing? We extended his license to the life of the patent. Christine: We ended up licensing him for fifteen years, but they had all sorts of problems with formulation. They did not get a product out until this year. Jim: It looks like if you are going to get a product on the market in less than a year, then you do not get an exclusive license for the life of the patent. This short excerpt highlights the relationship between commensuration work and the abstraction of rules whose generality makes them transferable to a wide range of situations while obscuring the specific context and contingent efforts that are integral to their creation and local implementation. 
Conceptual Spaces, TLO Work, and Change in Universities
Three very different conceptual architectures structure TLO discussions. The heterogeneous assemblages that are a focus of much descriptive effort are comprised of arrays or networks in the sense proposed by ANT. Efforts to partition, or frame those networks into unitary and separable (hence transferable) commodities are exercises in the creation of bounded regions. Finally, freewheeling commensuration efforts are, metaphorically, fluid (c.f., Mol & Law, 1994) . Where regional spaces are defined by creating and policing boundaries, and network topologies emphasize heterogeneous but immutable arrays, fluids represent a world of mixtures and mobile continuity. Regions shift when their boundaries are violated and networks reconfigure when one or more of their dimensions vary. Fluids, however, draw continuity from their very instability.
The TLO -itself a social object that might be characterized in these termsprovides a strategic location to elaborate upon Mol and Law's (1994) 
% of instances
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Notes 1 In the interests of confidentiality, I refer to the TLO, the university it represents, and the organizations and individuals that work in or interact with it using pseudonyms. Similarly, some aspects of technology dockets and deals have been altered. 2 The close analogy that could be drawn between the rationalization of locally sensible practices and the black-boxing (Latour, 1987) of facts and artifacts is not lost on me. The connection between processes of organizational and institutional development and the construction of knowledge suggests fertile ground for the integration of economic sociology, organizational theory and science studies. 3 The decision to disclose is largely in the hands of faculty who, as a condition of EPU's intellectual property policy, have the right to place inventions into the public domain through publication. In practice, even this large and experienced TLO lacks the competencies and resources necessary to prospect for new inventions on campus, or to strongly police the efforts of faculty. 4 Older dockets that were opened before the office 'went electronic' are actual physical files that contain a sometimes astonishing array of material ranging from handwritten correspondence between inventors and associates to hastily clipped newspaper articles, correspondence with the patent and trademark office, grant applications and academic reprints. As physical artifacts, dockets are reminiscent of the 'author files' maintained by trade and academic publishers (Powell, 1985) 5 While some of these cases involve descriptions of well know technologies and thus are likely to assume a degree of background knowledge on the part of the audience, the bulk of docket portrayals come from monthly meeting discussions where associates introduce newly disclosed technologies to the office. 6 In cases where co-inventors work in separate organizations it is common for ownership, 'the assignment,' of resulting patents to be held jointly by the organizations. In this case, however, full ownership went to EPU because the corporate researchers were working as visiting scientists in a university lab. 7 The unitary nature of this very brief description does not imply that this docket is not also a heterogeneous assemblage in the sense used by STS theorists. Nevertheless, this excerpt suggests the power of technical descriptions and artifacts to 'black-box' and obscure the social features that underlie and enable their creation and use (Bjiker & Law, 1992) . More importantly for our purposes, simple examples such as this suggest that the range of docket features that are salient for TLO associates can be very limited. Whether this offers a gauge for the value that associates ascribe to a docket or simply an indicator of its relative ambiguity is unclear. 8 A CIP is a continuation in part, a means to file an application for a patent that is a substantive alteration of an existing application 9 Funding, Inventor, Technology, IP, Publication (public disclosure at a conference), Expert, Costs, Market, and Licensee. 10 For consideration of discussions and contracts in another TLO see Kaghan (2001) and Kaghan & Lounsbury (2004) . 11 The 'holy clause' is included in every EPU license and is designed to maintain freedom of action for academic researchers by unconditionally reserving the right for EPU faculty to practice licensed inventions. Corporate challenges to the holy clause can be enough to render a deal unpalatable to TLO associates. 12 This type of maneuvering may become more important in academic TLOs as the widely shared assumption that academic inquiry falls under a 'research exemption' has met with setbacks in the wake of a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351; see also Eisenberg (2003) , for commentary). 13 Such options are, at EPU, always for non-exclusive licenses as both university policy and TLO practice attempt to reduce conflicts of interest by forbidding deals that 'pipeline' IP rights from a university lab to a corporate sponsor. 14 It should be noted that one of the differences mentioned here is a cheaper than standard licensing fee. On at least one dimension, then, this act of commensuration benefited F-co.
